

## Workshop

# Immunity to Error through Misidentification and Essential Indexicality

September 21<sup>st</sup>-22<sup>nd</sup> 2012, Konstanz

**Aims** The workshop will bring together recent developments in the discussion of immunity to error through misidentification (IEM) and explore the connections between IEM and essential indexicality. Talks will address issues such as these:

- What types of IEM are there? Which thoughts are IEM?
- What is the role of identification processes in the explanation of IEM?
- Can a better understanding of IEM improve our understanding of essential indexicality?
- Can the psychiatric symptom of thought insertion shed any new light on the question how we know ourselves to be the thinker of our thoughts?

**Participation** Everyone interested is kindly invited to attend the workshop. Attendance to the workshop is free. For further information please send a mail to Max Seeger <seeger@phil.hhu.de>.

**Location** The workshop takes place at the University of Konstanz, room C 427 (see below).

### *Friday, 21-9*

10.00-11.00	Gottfried Vosgerau & Max Seeger	Welcome & Introduction
11.30-12.30	John Schwenkler	Self-Consciousness in Thought and Action
14.00-15.00	Simon Prosser	The Structure of Indexical Belief
15.30-16.30	François Recanati	Immunity to error through misidentification in the mental file framework
17.00-18.00	Annalisa Coliva	Logical immunity to error through misidentification. What it is and why it matters

### *Saturday, 22-9*

9.00-10.00	Daniel Morgan	Why Physical Self-Ascriptions can be Immune to Error Through Misidentification in the Strongest Possible Sense
10.00-11.00	Kristina Musholt	Immunity to error through misidentification and the content of perception
11.30-12.30	Michael Pauen	Self-Consciousness and the Immunity to error through misidentification

## Program

Friday, 21.9.

**10.00-11.00 Gottfried Vosgerau & Max Seeger (Düsseldorf): Welcome & Introduction**

11.00-11.30 Coffee

**11.30-12.30 John Schwenkler (Mount St. Marys, Emmitsburg): Self-Consciousness in Thought and Action**

This paper explores the varieties of self-knowledge involved in thought and intentional action, arguing that each is rooted in *agents' awareness*, or the self-conscious awareness of one's own activity. I will argue that *agents' awareness* breaks down into (at least) two distinct species, which I will call *thinkers' awareness* and (somewhat unhappily) *actors' awareness*, each of which is a form of agential self-consciousness with properties that make it different from the other: in particular, while *thinkers' awareness* is always wholly non-perceptual, this is not true of *actors' awareness*, which often involves the perception of what one is doing. I also argue that the way that the knowledge of one's thoughts relates to *thinkers' awareness* is different from the way that the knowledge of one's actions relates to *actors' awareness*: in particular, though *thinkers' awareness* is often an *enabling condition* of the knowledge of one's thoughts, it is never the *evidential basis* of it, whereas *actors' awareness* can be an enabling condition *and* an evidential basis of the knowledge of what one is doing. In concluding my argument, I bring it into dialogue with the work of Christopher Peacocke and Lucy O'Brien.

12.30-14.00 Lunch (location tba)

**14.00-15.00 Simon Prosser (St. Andrews): The Structure of Indexical Belief**

I shall argue that indexical beliefs such as 'I am *F*' or 'it is *F* here' are akin to beliefs of the form 'that  $\phi$  is *F*'. I shall argue for this by appeal to cognitive dynamics, wherein a person who changes location between times  $t_1$  and  $t_2$  and believes, at  $t_1$ , that 'it is *F* here' should subsequently believe, at  $t_2$ , that 'it is *F* there' (where the tokens of 'here' at  $t_1$  and 'there' at  $t_2$  refer to the same location). This, I suggest, is best understood as a transition between belief states of the form 'that  $\lambda$  is *F*' and 'that  $\psi$  is *F*'. I shall then outline the significance of this for an account of *immunity to error through misidentification*. The key thought is that we must distinguish errors in the ' $\phi$ ' component of 'that  $\phi$  is *F*' from other kinds of errors.

15.00-15.30 Coffee

**15.30-16.30 François Recanati (Paris): Immunity to error through misidentification in the mental file framework**

In 'Immunity to error through misidentification : what it is and where it comes from' (2012), I corrected the account presented in *Perspectival Thought* (2007) by making room for thoughts that are *explicitly* first-personal or '*de se*' yet display immunity to error through misidentification. An explicit *de se* thought is a thought that involves the first person concept, a concept which, in my new book *Mental Files*, I analyse in terms of a special kind of mental file (the SELF file). What is it, then, for a thought involving such a mental file to be immune to error through misidentification? I will offer an answer to that question, and discuss a few counterexamples. I will end up with a discussion of the nature of 'absolute' or 'logical' immunity to error through misidentification.

16.30-17.00 Coffee

**17.00-18.00 Annalisa Coliva (Modena): Logical immunity to error through misidentification.  
What it is and why it matters**

In this paper I defend the idea that a neo-Fregean approach to the *de se* had better rely on the distinction between logical and *de facto* immunity to error through misidentification of different kinds of first-person thoughts. Given that that distinction has fallen into disrepute, since Evans' *The Varieties of Reference*, I make use of a framework developed in previous work of mine to defend it (§§1-2). I then argue that logical immunity serves to account for the mode of presentation which is constitutive of the first-person concept (§3) and that only that mode of presentation - according to which the self is roughly identical to the thinker of a presently given thought - allows to vindicate the broadly Fregean account of the *de se* (§4).

20.00 workshop dinner (location tba)

**Saturday, 22.9.**

**9.00-10.00 Daniel Morgan (Oxford): Why Physical Self-Ascriptions can be Immune to Error Through Misidentification in the Strongest Possible Sense**

In this talk, I argue against the dominant view (defended by, e.g., Coliva, Peacocke, Pryor, Wright) that current introspection gives rise to judgments that are IEM, whereas our ways of gaining knowledge about ourselves as physical as well as mental beings (memory, kinesthesia, proprioception) fail to. The possibility that supports the dominant view is the possibility of quasi-faculties (quasi-memory, quasi-kinesthesia, quasi-proprioception), which have been thought of as giving us access "as from the inside" to the physical states of other people. On the view I defend, our ways of gaining knowledge of ourselves as physical beings give rise to immunity to error through misidentification of the strongest grade there is, and the possibility of quasi-faculties shows nothing of interest about the nature of memory, kinesthesia, or proprioception. This is important, since the dominant view vindicates the idea that our knowledge of ourselves as mental beings is in some way more direct than our knowledge of ourselves as physical beings, and thereby supports the idea that our fundamental self-conceptions are conceptions of mental beings.

**10.00-11.00 Kristina Musholt (London): Immunity to error through misidentification and the content of perception**


This talk will examine the notion of immunity to error through misidentification and will question whether and how an analysis of the content of perception can contribute to our understanding of the immunity to error through misidentification of a certain class of self-conscious thoughts. I will argue that perception can give rise to first-person judgments that are immune to error through misidentification in virtue of containing implicitly self-related, or self-concerning, representations.

11.00-11.30 Coffee

### 11.30-12.30 Michael Pauen (Berlin): Self-Consciousness and the Immunity to error through misidentification

Judgments about one's own psychological states ("I feel pain") seem immune against the error through misidentification. I might mistake a tickle for a pain but it seems impossible that I mistake my pain for someone else's or vice versa. It has been argued that the immunity goes back to the absence of any identification or that it is guaranteed by the specific grounds of these judgments.

Here I try to show that this claim, intuitive as it is, is false. First, the mere absence of identification cannot guarantee that self-reference is successful. Second, it's the entire judgment that is either false or true, not its predicative or referential part. As a consequence, a strict distinction between misidentification and mispredication would be needed, but it will turn out that this is impossible. Third, many proponents think that immunity can be guaranteed by the grounds of first person judgments. It will be demonstrated, however, that this suggestion too is affected by the problem to distinguish between misidentification and mispredication. Apart from this, even the best grounds can't guarantee the truth of related judgments. Finally, empirical evidence will be provided in order to show that misidentification is actually possible.



Universität Konstanz  
Universitätsstr. 10  
D-78464 Konstanz  
www.gap8.de

- 1 Eingang links / Entrance left
- 2 Eingang rechts / Entrance right
- 3 Garderobe / cloakroom upstairs
- 4 Information / i-point caretaker

- A6 GAP.8 Congress Counter (17.9.-20.9.)
- A6 Audimax
- A7 Vortagsräume / lecture rooms
- C Vortagsräume / lecture rooms
- D Vortagsräume / lecture rooms
- K Mensa / Cafeteria
- K4 Arche / Chinese Restaurant